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Rupture in Modernity: 
A Case Study of Radicalism in the Late Qing Chinese Press Debate 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on the idea of organic society, this article examines the discourse of 
modernity in the late Qing press debate between the constitutional monarchist periodical 
Xinmin congbao and the revolutionary republican Minbao in 1905–1907. Using a corpus-
based analysis, the article identifies the negation of Chinese practices and institutions as 
contributing to a radicalised discourse. It argues that the loss of anchorage in traditions and 
experiences erodes the basis of conservatism as a counterbalancing force of social change. 
The discursive negation constitutes a critical rupture in Chinese modernity. As a broken link 
between social values and practice, the rupture spawns a utopian imagining of a future China. 
Revolutions as an extreme form of radicalism are symptomatic of the underlying anxieties of 
the Chinese collective self that struggles to achieve intellectual and emotional integrity in the 
pursuit of modernity. The article has three parts. Part one develops a tripartite organic society 
model to conceptualise the study. Part two presents a critical study of the late Qing press 
debate. Part three draws some conclusions by discussing the significance and consequences 
of the discursive patterns of radicalism in the press debate.1 
 
Key words: Chinese radicalism, organic society, Chinese modernity, late Qing Chinese 
press, Xinmin congbao, Minbao  
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Introduction  
 
In the ‘long revolution in a short twentieth century’ (Wang, 2015) from the Xinghai 
Revolution (1911) to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), China was engulfed in incessant 
transformations. In recent decades, scholarship has increasingly focused on the role of 
revolutions in China’s modernisation process (Li and Liu, 1999; Li, 2000; Chen, 2000; 
Wang, 2015). It highlights the importance of re-evaluating revolutions as a necessary 
condition to understand modern China. Most scholars tend to consider revolution within a 
modernisation paradigm, focusing on its efficacy in transforming China. Wang (2015), for 
example, construes revolutions as a struggle between modernisation and democracy. Xiao 
(2011) sees revolution as radical modernisation, sparked by the overdue Manchu court 
reform. Calling for an end to revolutions, Li and Liu (1999: 2) nonetheless affirm the ‘moral 
justification’ of the Xinghai Revolution. Fairbank (1986) and Zarrow (2005) discuss 
revolutions as the vicissitudes of modernisation drives. Yet despite its valuable perspective, 
the modernisation paradigm has insufficiently explained the intensity, persistence and appeal 
of revolutions. It may run the risk of a ‘normative fallacy’ – seeking to assess China against 
normative assumptions of modernity that may lead research to identify ‘deviations’ from the 
‘right’ pathways to modernity. Moving beyond the normative paradigm, this article assesses 
revolutions from the perspective of ‘organic society’ – how society evolves and deals with 
challenges as an organic whole and what roles revolution may play in social change. Thus, 
rather than focusing on struggles for the future, it examines linkages with the past – 
traditions, customs and institutions. Attention is given to the consequences rather than the 
desirability of change, to underlying beliefs rather than the strategies to be deployed. Some 
studies have already taken this route. Jin and Liu (2009), for example, study Chinese 
radicalism as a transitional phase of absorbing the European impact on China’s ‘ultra-stable’ 
society from a value-integration perspective. 
The aim of this study, however, is a modest one. It seeks to investigate how the idea 
of modernity is understood and presented in late Qing China by considering the discursive 
structures of the ‘revolution vs. reform’ debate in the press. By examining portrayals of social 
problems and solutions, it investigates the linkages between values systems and social 
practice. Central to this study is a concern with the way in which late Qing intellectuals 
approach social changes at a critical historical juncture. During a short period of less than two 
years, between 1905 and 1907, Xinmin congbao (XMCB, from issues No. 73 to 92) and 
Minbao (MB, issues No. 1 to 21) were engaged in a fierce debate over different routes to 
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modernity. The XMCB advocated ‘an enlightened absolutism’ as a transition to a 
constitutional state, but the MB argued for immediate revolution to topple the Manchu 
dynasty and establish a new republic. The debate became the most significant platform where 
the rationales, principles and objectives for these two visions of China were articulated. Led 
by the most influential cultural and political figures of the day, the debate was eagerly read 
by young literate elites, thanks to the rise of a modern press. The debate spread to more than 
20 news magazines in China and beyond to the overseas Chinese communities in Singapore, 
San Francisco and Los Angeles in an era of profound upheaval, uncertainty, national crisis 
and a flurry of political activity. For a long time, the debate has been conventionally 
portrayed as the last conservative resistance to the inevitable revolution that would spread 
‘enlightenment values’ and launch China into the modern age. But this is an incomplete grasp 
of the debate, its full consequences are yet to be explored. Many key concepts, values, terms 
and arguments that became prevalent throughout the twentieth century burst onto the scene 
during the debate. The 1915 New Cultural Campaign and 1919 May Fourth Movement are 
often viewed as the origins of Chinese radicalism (Li, 2000); and yet their structure of 
thinking, patterns of discourse and mode of expression resonate with those of the press 
debate. The debate contributed significantly to the rise of radicalism that ‘was born and 
acquired some of its adult characteristics during the period of 1903–8’ argued Gasster (1969: 
ix) in his study of modern Chinese radicalism. As a prototype of discourse for radical social 
change, the debate became the prelude to the ‘long revolution’ of the twentieth century.  
The late Qing debate is comparable to the great Anglo-American debate between 
Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine in the early 1790s over the French Revolution, which gave 
birth to modern political ‘right’ and ‘left’ (Levin, 2014). Both debates concern the 
justification of a violent removal of an ‘ancien régime’. Both have far-reaching repercussions 
in shaping the way we conceptualise social change. They are not a genteel intellectual 
discourse, but part of political actions with profound historical significance. For the Chinese 
debate, it swayed public opinion towards the revolution that uprooted Chinese society from 
its millennia-old traditions. The collapse of the Chinese imperial order is not only a political 
event – it has deep cultural consequences. But unlike the well-studied Burke/Paine debate, 
the Chinese debate has hitherto drawn scanty attention, incommensurate with its importance.2 
Collingwood (1994: 9–10) postulates that the value of history is to enhance human self-
knowledge crucial for understanding ‘his nature as man’. Investigating the debate facilitates a 
deeper understanding of the motivations and ramifications of radical social change. The 
debate texts provide us with valuable evidence of the mind-set of cultural leaders who were 
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swept to a position of influence by historical circumstances. The immense power they 
wielded, amidst dwindling imperial authority, engendered not only violent political actions, 
but bred a mode of thinking about social change. Before examining the case study, I discuss a 
tripartite organic social system as a frame of analysis for the debate, drawing on Spencer’s 
(2012) idea of society as an organism, and notions of conservatism and radicalism. This is 
followed by the case study of press debate. In the final part, I draw some conclusions by 
discussing the significance of the debate in terms of a utopian tendency in the process of 
Chinese modernisation.    
 
Organic society and social change  
 
A tripartite organic social system 
An organic view of society is an ancient conception that emerged in Plato’s time. As a key 
exponent of this view, Spencer (2008: 14) posits that a society is ‘a growth and not a 
manufacture’. The present conditions of society are the result of change in the past that is 
gradual, continuous and sequential. Spencer further contends that a well-developed society is 
a necessarily conservative one that tries to maintain the status quo, though it must meet 
external competition whereby change and adaption arise. Central to Spencer’s view is the 
notion of a society as a system comprising an aggregate of interrelated parts seeking to 
maintain an equilibrium through adaptation in the face of a changing environment. Drawing 
on Spencer’s (2008, 2012) and Radcliffe-Brown’s (1935, 1940) theories of organic society, I 
develop a tripartite organic social change model for the analysis of the press debate. Based on 
evolutionary theory, Spencer (2008: 14) identifies three fundamental aspects of similarity 
between societies and organisms in their growth: (1) from small groups to large aggregations, 
(2) from simple to complex structures, and (3) from independent units to an organism with 
interdependent parts.  Key to ‘social organism’ is the coordination between interdependent 
parts through ‘adaptation’, or ‘coadaptation’ in Radcliffe-Brown’s word. The adaptation is a 
mechanism to maintain the equilibrium of a social organism by changing its functions and 
structures to adjust to new environing conditions. Social organism is dynamically engaged in 
a constant process of adaptation. Highlighting the mutual interdependence between 
constituent parts in social change, Coser (1977: 307) resonates with Spencer’s view: ‘a 
complex of forms of processes each of which is living and growing by inter-action with the 
others, the whole being so unified that what takes place in one part affects all the rest. It is a 
vast tissue of reciprocal activity.’ 
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Three aspects to social organism, as macro constituent parts, are vitally important – 
social practice, institutions and values. Social practice consists of everyday human activities 
to survive in an environment governed by social conventions. It is a patterned way of 
behaviour evolved over a long period of time through habit, tradition or custom (Van 
Leeuwen, 2008: 6). Social institutions are formal organisational arrangements like marriage, 
family and government that grow naturally out of social practice. Their utility and legitimacy 
are internalised by members of society. Institutions are collectively sanctioned, continuous 
and established social practice. Radcliffe-Brown (1940: 9) defined social institutions as 
‘standardised modes of behaviour’ that ‘constitute the machinery by which a social structure, 
a network of social relations, maintains its existence and its continuity’. Social values operate 
at the symbolic level as a metaphorical approval of institutionalised social practice. They give 
‘meaning’ to social practice to confirm its validity and confer to it sanctity in the form of 
‘truths’. Abstract values include political, economic, moral, cultural and aesthetic dimensions 
that function to affirm, promote, consolidate and reproduce institutionalised social practice. 
Social stability relies heavily on consensual values in what Emile Durkheim calls the 
‘conscience collective’ through socialisation (Edgar and Sedgwick, 1999: 432). Malinowski 
highlights the importance of linking human practice with abstract and theoretical aspects of 
human thought and verbal usage. ‘The real understanding of words ultimately derives from 
active experiences of those aspects of reality to which the words belong’ (Malinowski, 1935: 
35). Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between social practice, institutions and values.  
 
Figure 1: Structure of social change  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value systems 
Social practice
Social 
insitutions 
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In this tripartite organic system of social change, practice, institutions and values are 
intrinsically linked in a process of adaptation to changing conditions. Habitual practice as 
recurrent daily activities evolve into social institutions, and settled institutions evolve into 
social values. Internalised as a set of beliefs, values are expressed in the symbolic world to 
regulate practices and institutions. Each of these three parts fulfils a specific function – 
practice meets daily survival needs; institutions provide stability of practice; and values 
reproduce institutionalised practice by assuring the society at large of its validity, efficacy 
and adequateness. From organic society’s perspective, function is defined as a contribution 
that ‘a partial activity makes to the total activity of which it is a part’ (Radcliffe-Brown, 
1935: 397). The three interrelated parts operate to achieve what Radcliffe-Brown calls ‘a 
functional unity’ – all work together to attain consistency and harmony by reducing frictions 
and conflicts. ‘Functional unity’ resonates with Spencerian ‘equilibration’ – the process of 
gradually reducing oscillations around the mean in a society. It is in this sense that Spencer 
defines a social system as ‘a whole whose parts are held together by complex forces that are 
ever re-balancing themselves – a whole whose moving equilibrium is continually disturbed 
and continually rectified’ (in Carneiro 1973: 84). Spencer identifies organic growth in a 
directional movement from simplicity to complexity, and in a relational movement from 
independence to interdependence. But the tripartite social system constitutes a cyclical 
movement between practice, institutions and values. The first two modes of movements 
involve organic expansion in quantity and quality, the cyclical movement operates to 
preserve the system in meeting changed conditions both within and without. As an organic 
unity, a society is a cumulative process consisting of a self-reinforcing cyclical movement of 
reproduction, adjustment and adaption.  
 
Organic society: equilibration between conservatism and radicalism  
Governed by a principle similar to a natural organism, society is vulnerable to sudden 
and drastic change. The way in which change is managed is vital to maintain its equilibrium. 
Change creates disturbance that triggers a process of equilibration by which imbalance 
between a system and the forces acting on it is reduced until a new balance is struck. The 
shifting equilibrium requires the recurring necessity of equilibration to adjust the system for 
optimal performance, survival and growth.  
Attitudes to societal change occur in a spectrum between conservatism preferring 
minimal change, and radicalism preferring maximal change. Conservatism arises as reaction 
to radicalism, which tends to move faster than social systems can adapt to. Conservatism 
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moves more slowly than required, to respond adequately to new conditions. As a political 
philosophy promoting traditional practice and institutions, conservatism favours gradual 
development to maintain the status quo. Radicalism supports swift and fundamental changes. 
Derived largely from Burke’s 1790 Reflections on the Revolution in France, conservatism 
has become a pertinent stance to social change. As a conservative statesman, Burke holds 
misgivings about radical alterations of society. Suspicious about abstract ideas that have not 
stood the test of time, Burke (2004: 23) commented, ‘I have no great opinion of that sublime 
abstract, metaphysic reversionary, contingent humanity, which in cold blood can subject the 
present time and those whom we daily see and converse with to immediate calamities in 
favour of the future and uncertain benefit of persons who only exist in idea.’ Opposed to the 
French Revolution, Burke did not fear France itself, but the kind of thinking that produced the 
events in France, and people who intended to introduce such thinking into England. At the 
heart of Burke’s conservatism is his tenacious belief in ‘a partnership not only between those 
who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to 
be born’ (2004: 194–5). Clearly, Burke’s conservatism is sensitive to the interdependent 
nature of society comprising practice and institutions as accumulation of historical 
experiences. It is a system-maintaining force preserving the existing equilibrium. Radicalism 
is a system-changing force aiming at rapid adaption to the perceived change of conditions. 
Edgar and Sedgwick (1999: 79) summarise conservatism as having (1) a negative attitude 
towards social change, (2) a faith in traditional moral and political values, (3) a general 
pessimistic view of human nature, and (4) seeing society as an interconnected structure of 
relationships. Favouring alterations to social structures in a fundamental way, radicalism is 
characterised by its advocacy of revolutionary means to achieve its objectives. The word 
radical means going to the root or origin; radicalism thus indicates the change of the roots of 
social practice, institutions and values. Radicalism has few qualms of upsetting the social 
system – its purpose is precisely to break the existing equilibrium for desired changes to 
occur.  
One way to ascertain if a society is in an optimal mode of performance is to assess to 
what extent social practice, institutions and values are in congruence with one another.  
 
The Great Press Debate  
 
Background to the press debate and method 
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Xinmin congbao was established by Liang Qichao in 1902 in Yokohama, Japan, after 
the failed 100-day reform when Liang was appointed as advisor to the young Emperor 
Guangxu (1871–1908). Having escaped to Japan, Liang continued to promote his reform 
agenda through the XMCB. The bi-monthly was later published irregularly and closed down 
in 1907 after producing 96 issues. Minbao was established in August 1905 in Tokyo, Japan, 
as an official organ of Tongmenhui (United Alliance Society) – the predecessor of the 
Nationalist Party. Initially a monthly, publication became erratic in later years. Key 
Tongmenhui members edited the MB, including Hu Hanmin, Zhang Binglin and Tao 
Chengzhang. It published 24 issues before its closure in October 1908.3 The debate between 
the two publications started officially on 8 April 1906 when the MB published its declaration 
of a ‘war of words’ on the XMCB, accusing the latter of contributing to China’s ‘immediate 
death’ by its advocacy of a constitutional monarchy. The MB raised 12 points of dispute with 
the XMCB and vowed to expose its folly. The debate continued into early 1907 when the 
XMCB pleaded for a ‘ceasefire’. For our analysis, two corpora were created, each consisting 
of all articles on either side of the debate. The total size of the dataset is 231,781 Chinese 
characters. The data for this study are selected from key articles of the debate: nine from the 
XMCB and 16 from the MB.  
 
Word frequency analysis: changing values system as a common ground 
A significant feature of the debate is the identical values system the two sides shared in 
constructing their arguments. As Table 1 shows, politics dominates the 20 most frequently 
occurring conceptual nouns, centring around post-enlightenment liberal democracy. Sixteen 
of the top 20 nouns are identical in the two publications. These high-frequency terms operate 
as lexical foci of the debate. They constitute the macrostructure that determines the debate’s 
global meaning under two subthemes – nation-state and modern institutions. Subsumed under 
the term ‘state’ (occurring 1,145 times in the 25 articles) are ‘citizenry’ (979), ‘society’ (391), 
‘people’ (388) and ‘race’ (308). The second subtheme comprises ‘government’ (733), 
‘absolutism’ (636), ‘republicanism’ (457) and ‘state organs’ (450). The overlexicalization 
through the high word frequency of key terms controls deductively local sequential 
propositions of the 12 points of dispute. Within an underlying consensus, the contested 
differences are limited to the narrow topic of the means of achieving political goals – if a 
revolution is justified. Opposed to revolution, the XMCB makes a case for an ‘enlightened 
absolutism’ as a transition to constitutional politics. Aiming to establish an immediate 
republic, the MB sees no alternative but to launch a revolution. 
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 It is important to distinguish between social reality and representation of social 
reality. Social practice and institutions are in the physical world while values sit in the 
symbolic world of representation. Practice and institutions are regulated through 
representation by correlating them with these high-frequency terms in a ‘conceptual map’ 
(Hall, 1997). The map consists not only of individual concepts expressed in these terms, but 
different ways of organising, classifying and clustering them, and of establishing complex 
relations between them. It is the interactions between these concepts as an ‘epistemic 
structure’ (Van Dijk, 2014: 228) that generate meanings in the debate. For example, the top 
three high-frequency nouns ‘state’, ‘citizen’ and ‘revolution’ are semantically linked to three 
clusters of terms that are combined to produce discursive formations of three novel 
perspectives on state, people and social change. This shifts the Chinese traditional worldview 
of tianxia (all under heaven) to the Western ‘nation-state’, imperial ‘subjects’ to autonomous 
‘citizens’, and ‘rebellion’ as a means for a cyclical change of dynasty to ‘revolution’ as a 
progressive removal of an ancien régime. Dispersed through the texts, these clusters function 
as a discursive motor driving local narrative forward normatively in liberal politics and 
radical economics (see analysis later). They structure new beliefs, convictions and visions by 
deploying a fresh episteme in addressing late Qing challenges of external encroachment, 
internal decay and a heightened sense of national crisis. The hierarchical structure governed 
by the high-frequency words defines the overall coherence of the discourse about new visions 
of state structure, people’s identities and mode of social change.  
 
Table 1: Top 20 most frequently occurring nouns  
 
No. Xingmin congbao Minbao  
1 State (496) Revolution (649 
2 Citizenry (492) State (509) 
3 Revolution (447) Citizenry (487) 
4 Absolutism (429) China (425) 
5 Government (371) Government (362) 
6 Politics (369) Land (328) 
7 China (331) Politics (296 
8 Republicanism (313) Manchuria (272) 
9 State organ (247) Society (260) 
10 Enlightenment (218) Problem (235) 
11 People (208) Absolutism (207) 
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12 Constitution (165) State organ (203) 
13 Monarch (164) Capital (191) 
14 Doctrine (158) People (180) 
15 Problem (153) Doctrine (175) 
16 Manchuria (138) Race (164) 
17 Liberty (135) Objectives (154) 
18 Race (134) Republicanism (144) 
19 Society (131) Monarch (138) 
20 Parliament (119) Policy (133) 
 
            (Notes: Numbers in bracket indicate word frequency. Words in bold occur only in one publication.) 
 
Minimal references are drawn from Chinese traditions, as shown in Table 2. Presented 
as evidence of Chinese practice now found in the modern West, the XMCB enlisted classical 
Legalism, Confucianism and Moism as the Chinese version of ‘enlightened absolutism’ in 
nineteenth-century Europe. Chinese thinkers Confucius and Xunzi were eulogised as 
exemplary ‘enlightened absolutists’. Legalism is singled out as possessing superior wisdom 
of enlightened absolutism – a form of government whose restoration is long overdue. In the 
only seven Chinese references the MB draws, Mencius’ morality is brought up to celebrate its 
revolutionary audacity. Statesmen Guanzi (725–645BC) and Shang Yang (390–338BC) were 
compared to Otto von Bismarck and Camillo Benso. Deprived of its epistemic autonomy, 
Chinese intellectual tradition is reduced to an appendix to post-enlightenment politics. In 
addition to being a rhetorical device, this mode of referencing the classics is what historian 
Yu Ying-shih (1993: 126) calls ‘interpretation as discovery’. That is, finding instances of 
Western practice in Chinese classics, and presenting it as existing or originating in China. Yu 
argues that late Qing intellectuals from Yan Fu to Kang Youwei discovered in the West a 
better alternative to Chinese learning; but rather than presenting it as a discovery they 
disguised it as reinterpretation of Chinese classics. This could be attributed to the Chinese 
critical tradition that criticism is confined to interpretation of ‘the Way’, rather than inventing 
or discovering new ones. The new ‘Western Way’ had to be cloaked in a Chinese guise. 
Obviously, Liang, as the XMCB’s sole writer, had moved beyond ‘reinterpretation’, though 
this mode of writing lingers on. Liang’s scanty allusion to Chinese sources reveals his 
relinquishment of the traditional repertoire. The MB revolutionary writers, on the other hand, 
saw no point in seeking validation from Chinese classics. Neither side saw traditional 
learning as a source of knowledge, authority or legitimacy. 
11 
 
 
Table 2: Word frequency of Chinese sources in the press debate 
 
Category Terms  XMCB MB Total 
 
Chinese 
intellectual 
traditions 
Legalism  11  11 
Confucianism  5  5 
Taoism  2  2 
Moism 2  2 
Lao-zhuang  1  1 
 
Chinese 
philosophers/7 
statesmen 
Mencius  4 3 7 
Confucius  5  5 
Mozi  5  5 
Shangyang  2 2 4 
Guanzi  3 2 5 
Laozi  1  1 
Hanfei  1  1 
Xunzi 1  1 
Total  43 7 50 
Percentage  86% 14% 100% 
 
 
Keyword analysis: battle between liberal politics and radical economics 
To uncover the thematic differences in the debate, I turn to ‘keyword’ as an analytical tool to 
examine the salient features of each side. WordSmith Tool’s ‘keyword’ function was 
performed to generate the two keyword lists. A keyword appears in a corpus statistically 
significantly more frequently than would be expected by chance when compared to another 
corpus (Baker, 2006: 125). Keywords are calculated by comparing the frequency of each 
word in the XMCB corpus with the frequency of the same word in the MB corpus. Table 3 
shows how certain terms are used significantly more by one side than the other. The degree 
of difference is measured by a ‘keyness’ index. For example, the keyness of the term 
‘absolutism’ is 120.51, suggesting it is the most salient word in the XMCB compared to the 
MB. The higher the score the stronger the keyness of that word. Keyness value gives an 
accurate and gradable account of the strength of salient terms in the debate. The lists shown 
in the table are derived from collecting all conceptual nouns in the keyword lists until the 
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keyness index drops to or near zero. Zero keyness would suggest no statistical difference 
exists for a term between the two corpora.  
                                                 Table 3: Keyword list in the debate 
 
No XMCB MB 
 Keyword Keyness Keyword Keyness 
1 Absolutism  120.51 Capital 136.70 
2 Republicanism  95.25 Production 97.21 
3 Enlightenment  71.08 Landlord  94.01 
4 Parliament 68.04 Capitalists 85.54 
5 Constitution  56.89 Land 80.59 
6 Military 
government 
52.99 Land rent 80.26 
7 Parliament4  49.39 Journalist 58.25 
8 Will 42.14 Sun Yet-san 53.10 
9 Legislation  36.94 Price 52.68 
10 Pre-condition 30.36 Rent 52.12 
11 Supervision  29.11 Public debts 45.49 
12 Opinion 27.29 Pricing 42.98 
13 Party 25.14 Price 41.75 
14 Politics  24.71 Method 40.03 
15 Current 
government 
24.21 State 
ownership  
39.61 
16   Population 39.55 
17   Distribution  38.39 
18   People’s 
livelihood  
38.04 
19   Income 36.39 
20   Foreign capital 31.56 
21   Tax  31.70 
22   Socialism  29.87 
23   Democracy  29.32 
24   Industry  27.82 
25   Land price 27.31 
26   Land 27.31 
27   Nation  25.58 
28   Manchuria  25.30 
29   Society 24.75 
13 
 
30   Europe & the 
United States 
24.34 
 
In the epistemic macrostructure of word frequency, global coherence is achieved by 
applying a post-enlightenment conceptual frame. Meaning is derived from direct relations 
between key concepts. However, the disputes are debated through referential coherence 
realised in sequential local microstructures. That is, arguments are made by manipulating 
relations between historical facts referred to and those represented subjectively in the debate. 
Meaning is produced by relations between represented events in local narratives in terms of 
temporality and causality. For example, the Manchus are presented by the MB as causing 
China’s problems and therefore must be removed through an ethnic revolution. But the 
XMCB sees the Manchus as part of the Chinese nation and therefore a reformed Manchu 
court is part of the solution to shared problems. The disputes are therefore argued by 
reference to underlying subjective and intersubjective mental models of late Qing social 
realities. The debate is limited to ways of social change – practicality, technicality, 
temporality, etc.   
A notable aspect of the keyword lists is the contrasting priorities of each side. The 
XMCB focuses on constitutionalist liberal politics, but the MB on socialist radical 
economics. It is significant that 50% of the XMCB keywords are identical to its top 20 high-
frequency nouns, but only 13% of MB’s terms coincide with its top 20 nouns. This indicates 
the XMCB applies the same conceptual map as its epistemic macrostructure for global and 
local meanings. For the MB, a different subset of values – radical socialist economics – is 
applied as the sequential microstructure for local meanings. This discrepancy shows the 
XMCB is committed to liberal politics despite its seemingly conservative advocacy of 
‘enlightened absolutism’. In contrast, the MB is committed to radical socialism for economic 
egalitarianism in addition to political equality. The XMCB anticipates considerable obstacles 
in achieving liberal democracy; but the MB envisions barriers brought crashing down in the 
pursuit of social justice. But in the end, the XMCB has greater difficulties in promoting its 
programme, largely because ‘absolutism’ is a negative and emotionally-charged term 
associated with the corrupt, autocratic Manchu rule under Cixi the dowager. The MB’s moral 
stance of socialism works on a different aspect of emotions. It is semantically linked to an 
unequal economic structure where ‘capital’ is portrayed as the chief means through which an 
elite minority control and exploit the majority. ‘Capital’ as a negative term tops the MB 
keyword list as the most significant concept that drives local narratives.  
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Invoking state theories of Bornhak and Bluntschli, the XMCB underpins its argument 
for constitutionalism in a semantic cluster of ‘parliament’, ‘constitution’, ‘government’, 
‘legislation’, ‘supervision’ and ‘(political) party’. It activates a schematic knowledge of 
incremental institutionalism. Citing ‘enlightened’ Prussian Frederick the Great, Russian 
Emperor Peter the Great and Empress Catherine the Great as models Manchu monarchs could 
emulate, the XMCB argues a powerful monarch with a modern mind could make systematic 
and rational attempts to modernise China. The paradox of the XMCB position lies in the 
seeming incompatibility between advocacy of absolute monarchy and promotion of liberal 
institutions. Focusing on radical economics, the MB highlights socialist principles in two 
thirds of its keywords including ‘capital’, ‘production’, ‘landlord’, ‘capitalists’, ‘land’, ‘rent’ 
and ‘price’. The semantic cluster operates under the political frame of ‘people’s livelihood’, 
‘state ownership’, ‘democracy’ and ‘nation’ that constitute Sun Yetsan’s ‘three People’s 
Principles’ – nationalism, people’s rights and people’s livelihood. The keywords’ semantic 
focus shows ‘people’s livelihood’, or social reform, represents the MB’s most significant 
difference with the XMCB. Committed to egalitarian reform, the MB collapses the temporal 
frame required of social change into a single revolution. The focus on a ‘post-revolution’ 
social reform reveals the MB’s grand design of social engineering, with little attention to the 
social consequences the XMCB is worried about. The XMCB underscores the present 
conditions as the basis for a practical solution, but the MB underlines future objectives of 
ideal goals to achieve. Nevertheless, sharing similar future visions, neither engages seriously 
with the past.  
 
Ascertaining social reality: rationale for social change 
The late Qing debate has a different nature from the Burke/Paine debate. The latter has a 
distinct tradition to preserve or to break away from. For Burke, the inherited practice and 
institutions have their natural values as accumulation of human experiences. For Paine, 
progressive principles should guide political actions in changing practices and institutions 
unfit for higher ideals. They underpin their arguments in different sets of worldviews opposed 
to each other. Their dispute concerns such fundamental issues as nature, history, society, 
reason, freedom, equality and political institutions. In the XMCB/MB debate, the two sides 
share the same inspiration to break away from Chinese traditions – there was little they 
sought to preserve, except that the XMCB favours retention of the monarchy as the transition 
to modern politics. Both underpin their arguments with the fundamental values of 
enlightenment – the XMCB focusing on liberal constitutionalism and the MB on radical 
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socialism. The substantial division between them, however, is (1) their approach to achieve 
modern politics, and (2) their assessment of social reality as rationale for political action. As 
Table 4 shows, out of the 12 points of dispute, nine (75%) focus on the approach to achieve 
the desired changes. The remaining three involve institutions (Disputes 1 and 12) and social 
practice (Dispute 3). The republicanism vs. absolutism dispute relates to different timeframes 
to achieve liberal politics, because absolutism is a bridge to constitutionalism. Socialism was 
an imaginative institution at the time of the debate as it had never existed in human history, 
except local experiments in Europe and America. The socialism dispute concerns mainly the 
issue of practicality of a socialist system in agrarian China. Nonetheless it is part of European 
post-enlightenment social imagining.  
 
Table 4: Twelve points of debate  
 
 Minbao  Xinmin congbao  
P
r
a
c
tice 
In
stitu
tio
n
 
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
 
1 Republicanism  Absolutism   √  
2 Constitutionalism by means of democracy Enlightened absolutism from the government   √ 
3 Revolution because of evil government Absolutist government because of bad people √   
4 Revolution and education as means  No idea what to do   √ 
5 Political as well as ethnic revolution  Enlightened absolutism and political reform   √ 
6 Political revolution to overthrow the monarch and 
ethnic revolution to drive out the Manchus 
Political revolution and ethnic revolutions are 
incompatible. 
  √ 
7 Political revolution demands force Political revolution needs petition   √ 
8 Force is the basis of a revolutionary cause Coercion comes only after petition fails   √ 
9 Other than refusal to pay taxes and assassination, 
revolution has its own means 
Coercion takes the form of refusing to pay taxes 
and of assassination 
  √ 
10 Nihilists are revolutionary, not mere assassins Revolution is undesirable; nihilism is necessary   √ 
11 Revolution for a republic  Revolution begets dictatorship   √ 
12 Advocate socialism to solve future social problems  Socialism only agitates beggars and the 
homeless5 
 √  
    8.3
%
 
1
6
.7
%
 
7
5
%
 
 
 
What is of importance is the assessment of Chinese practice, institutions and values as 
the second area of major division. This assessment underlies the rationales behind the 
arguments for all other 11 disputes. The MB believes the way the Manchu government 
behaves constitutes the fundamental problem; but the XMCB sees the problem located in the 
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ignorance and backwardness of the people. Thus, the XMCB holds the people responsible for 
the predicament China finds itself in. The MB holds the ‘foreign’ Manchu government 
accountable because it is illegitimate, corrupt and effectual. The MB argues evil governments 
produce ignorant people, not the other way around. For the XMCB, the Chinese people are 
unqualified for a modern republic because they do not understand what are ‘nation’ and 
‘state’, let alone the existence of other countries. What is worse, they are submissive subjects, 
not independent citizens. Liang elaborated this view in his 20 XMCB articles between 1902 
and 1906, published later as a book, Discourse on New Citizen. Liang contends in the book: 
‘China is destined to extinction, not due to foreign aggressions or the evil government, but to 
the heartlessness, brainlessness and timidity of its 400 million people. It is the dumbness of 
its people that has driven China to almost extinction’. Liang sees no alternative but allowing a 
longer timeframe for people to become ‘new citizens’. Otherwise, he argues, China would 
descend into a chaos of infighting in the vacuum of effective political authority – thereby 
inviting foreign intervention and colonial occupation. On closer examination, these 
conclusions are not drawn from considered empirical evidence, but from measuring Chinese 
sociocultural identities against European post-enlightenment values. This categorical, rather 
than analytical mode of presentation is part of a discourse of denial and negation of 
indigenous social realities, conditions and social evolution. The emotionally-charged style of 
writing, though toned down later, reflects the nature of the debate as a political polemic. It 
inspires political actions to change society rather than encouraging empirical investigation to 
understand society. More importantly, the publications rely on their arguments to appeal to 
the reading pubic for support. Ultimately, the polemic is deployed for political mobilisation. 
Each saw in the other a dangerous agenda that threatened to derail its modernisation 
programme. The stakes could not be higher.  
 
Radicalism, revolution and the rupture 
 
Reverse social change and the break with traditions 
Within an externally derived conceptual map, the XMCB and MB debate different routes to 
modernity. Frustrated by decades of failings to meet external challenges, they hasten to 
measure Chinese practices against post-enlightenment values. The anachronous comparison 
leads to a reverse order of social change. Rather than responding to change from practice in a 
Spencerian ‘spontaneous evolutionary process’, they advocate installation of Western 
institutions inspired by liberal politics that have little bearing on Chinese experiences. Such 
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institutions are either imposed through a revolution or by pressuring a social entity (e.g. the 
monarchy) to comply. Thus, a reverse process occurs – change starts from abstract values and 
moves to institutions as materialisation of values, and finally to practice as mechanically 
imposed behaviour. A reverse process of change tends to occur in an externally-induced 
social change as in the case of late Qing China, because it is not social practice that demands 
adjustment, but the external impact that threatens to damage the social organism. As a social 
system in a stable equilibrium, social practice and institutions operate to reinforce the system 
and therefore are averse to change – they are the conservative system-maintaining force. 
Thus, the first casualty of reverse social change is inevitably traditions. It is not a chance 
casualty but a targeted one, because traditions are seen as liabilities, not assets. Under 
external pressures, survival instincts dictate drastic actions to be taken as an adaptation for 
equilibration. But there is a problem – a society is a cumulative process that consists of a self-
reinforcing cyclical movement of practice, institutions and values as an organic unity.  
As Figures 2 and 3 show, the reverse order creates a break between external values 
and indigenous practice. Drastic alteration in the values system puts a considerable strain on 
the relationship between institutions and practice, in particular between values and practice. 
As institutions and values are introduced as one (organic) package, it needs to be imposed on 
society. This imposition instigates a substantial disturbance to the social organism, activating 
a process of Spencerian ‘adaptive metamorphosis’ (in Simon, 1960: 295) or ‘indirect 
equilibration’ – re-establishment of equilibrium between surviving society and its new 
environment (Carneiro, 1973: 89). Fully aware of the need to impose institutions in China, 
both sides of the debate were ready to apply coercion. For the MB, the imposition involves 
not only a revolution to remove the ancien régime of the Manchu dynasty, but on society 
through a three-step phase of ‘military government’, ‘supervisory government’ before a 
‘constitutional government’ can be installed. For the XMCB, ‘a political revolution’ is 
required to bring about ‘enlightened absolutism’ – involving such means as assassinations 
and refusal to pay taxes. ‘Enlightened’ is a condition imposed on the monarch to serve 
national rather than dynastic interests. ‘Absolutism’ is imposed on society as a necessary 
authoritarian rule to ‘modernise’ it. Institutions as rules can be imposed top-down on society 
by coercion, but it is much harder to force people to accept values that have little relevance to 
their lives. For social practice to be reproduced spontaneously, there needs to be an organic 
link between social practice and values. It is here that the exercise of coercion finds its limits 
– people can be forced to change their external behaviour, but not how they think. A crack 
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appears in the organic society, breaking the link between values and the reproduction of 
practices, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Negation, radicalism and revolution 
In their negative assessment of late Qing society, these debaters were driven to build a better 
future (see Table 5). By targeting social identity to develop ‘new citizens’ in a social 
campaign, the XMCB is as radical as the MB that seeks to impose new institutions in a 
political campaign. However, both sides lose anchorage in social reality in their negation of 
indigenous practice and institutions. They do not identify what is worth preserving, and 
therefore fail to define a social position. The negation takes the implicit form of discursive 
absence or non-recognition of Chinese traditions, and the explicit form of sweeping criticisms 
of Chinese practice. The loss of anchorage means the absence of a reference system of 
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standards or benchmark, against which conservative or radical positions are identified and 
articulated. The nature of the debate is located therefore not in differing views of what to 
preserve, but in a binary opposition between the negative present and a positive future. 
Empirical reality slips out of view in an argument about ideologies. The missing referential 
benchmark is a key source of radicalisation – nothing is protected or free from change. As Yu 
(1993: 141) argues, people in early twentieth-century China were driven by ever newer 
ideologies in a ‘neoterist mentality – a mentality obsessed with change, with what is new’.      
 
Table 5: Summary of the press debate  
 
Areas XMCB MB 
Values Fundamental change  Fundamental change 
Institutions Incremental but 
fundamental change 
Immediate and fundamental 
change 
Practice Change bad people Change bad government 
Means  Reform Revolution  
 
Imposing change disturbs the natural coordination between different parts; as Spencer 
argues, ‘to interfere with this process by producing premature development in any particular 
direction is inevitably to disturb the true balance of organisation by causing somewhere else a 
corresponding atrophy’ (in Carneiro, 1960: 297). The atrophy in the Chinese case is 
traditions, which came under severe and sustained attack. Radicalism takes the ultimate form 
of revolution – an uncompromising stance and actions of destroying the old in establishing 
the new. The stronger the force for change, the greater the power of revolution. As the 
negation of traditions grew stronger in the late 1910s May Fourth Movement, a full-blown 
iconoclastic attack on Confucianism became inevitable. Late Qing intellectual radicalism 
contributes significantly to the 1911 Xinghai Revolution and indirectly to ‘the long 
revolution’ throughout the century. The press debate created a prototypical discursive 
structure to talk about social change. First, the discursive absence of anchorage in society – 
nothing is fixed for preservation; nothing is spared the force of sweeping change. Second, 
traditions and modernity are seen through an antagonistic rather than accommodating lens. A 
mechanistic view of replacement (of the old with the new) is premised on the discourse of 
negation – a continuous negation of not only the past as traditions, but the present as 
accumulation of the past. This ‘new-as-progressive’ discourse reduces fundamental values 
such as equality and liberty to a ritualistic, mechanical act of substitution. Third, a discourse 
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of coercion is moralised in an elitist authoritarian imposition of rules as an act of progress 
much like imperial benevolence is bestowed to subjects. Fourth, a utopian vision of the future 
is implicit in the discourse of change. Ironically, the broken link between values and practice 
enhances utopian tendencies of talking about the future, because utopian discourse bears less 
burden of empirical practicality when the past and much of the present are dispensed to the 
land of ‘dystopia’.  
These discursive features constitute much of the radicalising tendencies towards 
social change. However, radicalism can be viewed as a coping strategy for a social system to 
deal with extensive external impact, perceived to threaten the survival of the whole system. It 
is a type of overcompensation for the lack of available intellectual resources in a reverse-
order social change, necessitated also by the required rapid equilibration and considerable 
inertia of a large and deeply conservative society like China. Radicalism as 
overcompensation operates predominantly in the symbolic world of values in a top-down, 
mechanistic, authoritarian mode of enforcement. It is characterised by a high level of 
abstraction because intangible values deal with mental models of reality rather than reality 
itself. Radicalism is also imbued with heavy doses of moralism since mobilisation of support 
relies not only on immediate material interests but appeal to higher ideals. It may require 
sacrifice from participants as in the case of revolutions. The moral high ground is not a 
guarantee of success but it is a necessary condition. Emotion is essential to radicalism as 
people respond to emotion as much as, if not more than, intellect. Radicalism resorts to and 
thrives on rhetorical power.  
However, radicalism and its extreme form of revolution are symptomatic of a schism 
in late Qing China and throughout the twentieth century. It is the rupture between traditions 
and modernity. The enduring energies and momentum of the long revolution arose from a 
persistent negation of the past, and the constant pull of a utopian future. It is human nature to 
have a meaningful connection not only with the future, but also with the past to achieve a 
coherent conceptual self both for individuals and society. This view lies at the heart of 
Burke’s defence of historical experiences as the foundation of a healthy society. It is hard to 
predict when the pendulum of equilibration will swing back from its overcompensation, but 
coming to terms with traditions and locating a meaningful connection between the past, the 
present and future constitute a major challenge on the Chinese road to modernity. 
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